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After publication of Adam Hochschild’s King Leopold’s Ghost in 1998, asserting that King Leopold II had been responsible for a “holocaust” in the Congo 
and the heated public debate this provoked, we set out to study Belgian people’s reactions to these accusations. In two studies we compared collec-
tive memories of and emotions associated with Belgium’s colonial action in the Congo in different generations. Results show higher levels of collective 
guilt and support for reparative actions among young adults than among older generations. This difference can be explained either by referring to the 
different ideological backgrounds in which different generations were socialized, as evidenced by stark differences in collective memories of colonialism, 
or by referring to the influence of national identification. Indeed, people could adapt their representations of colonialism in order to avoid experiencing a 
social identity threat. However, evidence for the identity-protecting functions of collective memories and collective emotions was only found in the older 
generations: young people held negative representations of colonialism independently of their level of national identification. We refer to the normative 
dimension of collective guilt to interpret these results.
Holocaust or Benevolent Paternalism?  
Intergenerational Comparisons on Collective Memories 
and Emotions about Belgium’s Colonial Past
Laurent Licata, Social Psychology Unit, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium 
Olivier Klein, Social Psychology Unit, Université Libre de Bruxelles, Belgium
1. A Severed Bronze Hand
An imposing statuary group stands by the sea in Ostend, 
Belgium, erected in 1931 to honor the city’s “genial protec-
tor”, King Leopold II. The statuary group is dominated by 
an equestrian statue of the king, with two sets of figures 
looking up to him in gratitude: on one side local fishermen, 
peasants and city dwellers, on the other, Congolese people 
accompanied by a European explorer (probably Stanley). In 
2004, a local anarchist group (De Stoete Ostendenoare), cut 
the hand off one of the Congolese figures.
One of the members explained in an anonymous newspa-
per interview that their action had been a protest against 
the official version—as stated on a nearby plaque—that 
the Congolese were grateful to the Belgian king for freeing 
them from Arab slavery (De Coninck 2005). The anarchists 
offered to return the stolen hand in exchange for a rectifica-
tion: “This is pure revisionism. What King Leopold II did 
was to administer the Congo as his private property and 
exploit the Congolese in his rubber plantations. Everyone 
knows it was common practice to cut off the hands of Con-
golese who were judged to be lazy. This is why we severed 
the hand. It makes the image more realistic” (translated 
from De Coninck 2005). Today, the hand is still missing.
This incident reveals much about the Belgians’ relationship 
with the memory of the colonization of the Congo. To start 
with, it opposes two radically different versions of Belgium’s 
colonial history. The first, symbolized by the monument, is 
a narrative of civilization and development accomplished 
by the Belgians, under the guidance of Leopold II. In less 
than eighty years they turned this terra incognita—this 
“heart of darkness” (Conrad 1902) fallen prey to hostile 
nature, continuous tribal wars, and cruel slave traders—into 
a prosperous land equipped with a modern infrastructure, 
means of communication, hospitals, and schools. We found 
expressions of that representation when we interviewed 
former Belgian colonials for a previous study (Licata and 
Klein 2005). They compared the relationship between 
colonizers and colonized to that between parents and chil-
dren. According to this paternalistic view (Jackman 1994), 
colonization was primarily aimed at fulfilling the needs of 
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the colonized, as a father would care for his children. They 
reminded us that the Congolese called the white colonials 
“Noko” (uncle). The second representation, the one sym-
bolized by the anarchists’ action, presents colonialism as 
a large-scale enterprise of systematic human rights viola-
tions—forced labor, bloody repression of uprisings, atroci-
ties—for the benefit of first an unscrupulous king, later a 
nation of shameless exploiters. 
These representations embody two different kinds of col-
lective memory. The anarchists attack a vector of the official 
memory put forward by the authorities: cast in bronze, 
commemorated in collective rituals, taught in schoolbooks. 
They stand instead for a vivid, dissident memory, closer to 
the people, orally transmitted, and resisting official influ-
ence (van Ypersele 2006). They oppose “revisionism” and 
sought to render the representation “more realistic” by 
severing the hand. 
During the past decade, the opposition between these two 
versions of the colonial past has come to the surface in 
different ways in Belgium. The conflict was triggered—or 
revived—in 1998 by the publication of American journalist 
Adam Hochschild’s book King Leopold’s Ghost: A Story of 
Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial Africa, which was 
translated into French and Dutch the same year. A bestsell-
er, the book resuscitated a long-forgotten controversy about 
the real nature of Leopoldian colonialism (Marechal 2005). 
Hochschild explains how Leopold II started by financing 
Henry Morton Stanley’s expeditions to central Africa, then 
managed to convince the European powers to let him rule 
the Congolese territory (about eighty times the size of Bel-
gium) at the 1885 Berlin Conference. The Congo Free State 
virtually became his private property, while the Belgian 
government was then uninvolved. Hochschild depicts a par-
ticularly brutal system of appropriation of territory, military 
suppression of rebels, exploitation of wealth and, especially, 
of the Congolese workforce. Citing extremely high numbers 
of casualties (ten million), the author calls the events of this 
period of Belgian colonialism a genocide (in French the 
book’s subtitle became “un Holocauste oublié,” or a forgot-
ten Holocaust). He describes atrocities including killings, 
keeping women and children as hostages to force men to 
collect rubber in the forest, physical punishments, and in 
particular, the severing of hands. Hochschild explains how 
soldiers of the colonial army fighting insurrections were 
ordered to bring back a hand of each person they killed to 
justify their use of ammunition. But soldiers would also cut 
off the hands of the living in order to use the ammunition 
for hunting. Photographs of severed hands and mutilated 
people are included in the book. These abuses were de-
nounced by an international humanitarian campaign at the 
beginning of the twentieth century (Morel 1906), eventu-
ally leading Leopold II to donate the colony to the Belgian 
government in 1908. Congo then became a proper Belgian 
colony until 1960, when it gained its independence.
The book triggered contrasting reactions. First among 
historians, who questioned the validity of Hochschild’s 
figures. Historians are still currently debating the exact 
extent of the harm done to the Congolese people during the 
different phases of Belgian colonialism (versus its benefits), 
the intentionality behind these sufferings, and the degree 
to which colonialism is responsible for the country’s pres-
ent situation (Ndaywel è Nziem 2005; Vellut 2005). But the 
book also aroused reactions among the public. Some—in 
particular the former colonials—expressed indignation, 
contesting and delegitimizing this version of history and 
stressing the positive side of colonialism in the journals and 
websites of colonial associations. Some even pressed for the 
banning of cultural events (for example Marc Twain’s play 
King Leopold’s Soliloquy in 2005). Other Belgians welcomed 
the book as a revelation, soon followed by a different kind 
of indignation: “Why hasn’t this been made public before?” 
In both cases, the emotion—as a response to infamy or un-
veiled truth—was vividly felt. For both groups, the conflict 
between the two historical narratives was intertwined with 
concerns about the meaning of their identity. 
As social psychologists, we have always been interested in 
the ways in which societal dynamics permeate individual 
psyches, as well as the ways in which psychological pro-
cesses influence societal dynamics. Collective memory 
is one of those concepts that lie precisely at the interplay 
between the individual and society. As a consequence, we 
have followed the controversy over Belgium’s colonial past 
with great attention, and started studying memories of 
the colonial past at the beginning of the 2000s (see Licata, 
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Klein, and Gurrieri in press for a general overview). In 
this article, we present the findings of two of these studies, 
focusing particularly on the changes in collective memories 
between the generation of Belgians born and raised during 
the colonial period and today’s generation of young adults, 
and highlighting the role of collective emotions and identity 
concerns in that evolution.
2. Collective Memories through the Generations
Several definitions of collective memory are available.1 They 
vary according to the standpoints of the different disciplines 
(Coman et al. 2009; Olick 1999; Wertsch and Roediger 
2008). We adopt a definition that clearly situates collective 
memory at the interplay between processes of social repre-
sentation (Moscovici 1961 [1976]) and social identity (Tajfel 
and Turner 1986): “a set of shared representations of the past 
based on group members’ common identity” (Licata and 
Klein 2005). This definition echoes Maurice Halbwachs’s 
conception: “While collective memory endures and draws 
strength from its base in a coherent body of people, it is 
individuals as group members who remember” (Halbwachs 
1980). Halbwachs also points out that collective memories 
form and are expressed in specific social frameworks (Hal-
bwachs and Coser 1992), and that this framework’s charac-
teristics affect the content of memories as well as the ways 
in which events are remembered.
This last aspect of Halbwachs’s theory has important impli-
cations for the way we appraise intergenerational differences 
in collective memories of colonial times. First, the social 
and ideological framework has changed dramatically dur-
ing the last fifty years. Congo became independent in 1960. 
Belgian people born during or before that period grew up 
in a largely pro-colonial environment. Congo was pictured 
as “the best of the colonies,” as Belgian colonialism was 
viewed as mainly benevolent and the Belgian Congo’s mate-
rial infrastructure was one of the most developed among 
European colonies. By contrast, contemporary Belgians 
have witnessed numerous controversies about the evils of 
colonialism, both Belgian and foreign. First anti-, then post-
colonial discourses have spread through Western societies 
(Loomba 2005; Young 2001; Fanon 1967; Memmi 1965) and 
shattered the former positive representation. As sociological 
studies demonstrate, people tend to remember the events 
that were salient during their adolescence and early adult-
hood (Schuman, Belli, and Bischoping 1997; Schuman and 
Rodgers 2004). Psychologists also study this “reminiscence 
bump” (Conway and Pleydell-Pearce 2000). People tend to 
remember events in a way that is consistent with the social 
and ideological framework of their youth, so older Belgians 
should express more positive representations of the colonial 
past than young adults.
However, Halbwachs (1980) also points out that collective 
memory always serves contemporary functions: it “retains 
from the past only what still lives or is capable of living in 
the consciousness of the groups keeping the memory alive” 
(80). This functional aspect of collective memory is also 
emphasized by Frederick Bartlett (1932), another pioneer 
of collective memory studies: “With the individual as with 
the group, the past is continually being re-made, recon-
structed in the interests of the present“ (309). Collective 
memories are not fixed once and for all in people’s minds; 
they change in order to better fulfill their present functions. 
So generational differences might not (or not only) be due 
to differences in the social framework of the time they were 
encoded into memory, but also to the fact that memories 
can serve different functions in different generations. In 
particular, the identity functions of collective memories are 
often stressed (see Licata, Klein, and Gély 2007 for a review). 
People sometimes forget, distort, justify, or negate histori-
cal events in order to obtain or maintain a positive image of 
their group (Baumeister and Hastings 1997). 
In this paper, we investigate how Belgians’ memories of this 
past and the associated emotions and behavioral intentions 
are influenced both by the ways in which two (or three) gen-
erations of Belgians learned about their colonial history and 
by the effects of current identity concerns. For the sake of 
clarity of presentation, we structure the article as a succes-
1 Some authors prefer to use the term “social 
memory” (Laurens and Roussiau 2002), paral-
leling the distinction between the Durkheim-
ian concept of collective representations and 
the concept of social representation pro-
posed by Serge Moscovici (1961 [1976]). 
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sion of issues that we address with reference to both studies, 
rather than presenting each separately.
3. Different Emotions and Support for Reparative Action
In our Three-Generation Study (as opposed to the Two-
Generation Study, see below), we asked French-speaking 
Belgian undergraduate psychology students to fill in a 
questionnaire about Belgian colonial activities in the 
Congo (n = 178; mean age = 20).2 Then they were asked to 
administer the same questionnaire to one of their parents 
(n = 171; mean age = 49), and to one of their grandparents 
(n = 152; mean age = 74).3 The questionnaire included mea-
sures of collective guilt and of support for reparative action 
for the Congolese. Collective guilt has been widely studied 
in social psychological research on intergroup conflicts and 
reconciliation processes (Branscombe and Doosje 2004). 
This emotion can be experienced “by association” for ac-
tions committed by other in-group members, often in the 
past. According to Branscombe (2004), it is a self-focused 
and aversive emotion that people usually seek to avoid, but 
which can lead to positive actions towards victims in order 
to repair the harm done to them. We measured it through 
a set of four nine-point items such as: “As a Belgian, I 
feel guilty about what happened in the Congo” or “As a 
Belgian, I feel regret when I think about what the Belgian 
administration and Belgian colonials did to the Congolese 
during the colonial period” (α = .79). Intergenerational 
comparisons (between-subjects comparisons) on this mea-
sure show that students (M = 4.34) reported significantly 
more collective guilt than grandparents (M = 3.70), with 
parents standing in-between (M = 4.04. F (2, 500) = 4.32; p 
= .01). This finding is in line with earlier observations sug-
gesting that people directly involved in collective traumatic 
events tend to feel less guilt than later generations (Dresler-
Hawke and Liu 2006; Marques, Paez, and Serra 1997; Paez 
et al. 2006).
We also asked them to express their degree of support for 
symbolic and material reparation: “I believe that the Belgian 
government should publicly apologize for its actions under 
colonialism” and “I believe that the Belgian government 
should offer financial compensation to the Congolese for 
its actions under colonialism” (α = .76). Again, students (M 
= 5.78) were significantly more in favor of reparation than 
their grandparents (M = 3.66), with parents similarly occu-
pying an intermediate but distinct position (M = 5.02. F (2, 
500) = 36.14; p < .001); symbolic reparation was supported 
more strongly than financial compensation in all groups.
As argued previously, these differences in collective guilt 
and support for reparation could be due to differences in 
socialization between the generations. In that case, we 
should observe differences in the way people learned about 
colonialism as a function of their generation. And represen-
tations of the colonial past should also be different. Finally, 
differences in representations should explain differences in 
collective guilt and support for reparation.
4. Different Ways of Learning about Colonialism
Another of our studies—carried out with Cristina Stanciu 
(2003)—investigated the way in which members of two 
generations were taught about colonialism. A questionnaire 
was administered to French-speaking Belgian undergradu-
ate psychology students (n = 64; mean age = 24) and to a 
sample of members of a senior citizens’ association (n = 54; 
mean age = 69). We will refer to it as the Two-Generation 
Study.4 The first question asked whether or not they had 
been taught about colonialism at school. About half of the 
participants in both groups answered that they had (51.9 
percent of the retired people; 45.3 percent of the students. 
Χ² (1) = .5; n. s.). So there was no significant difference in ex-
posure to this theme at school. Then we asked participants 
who had answered the first question positively how detailed 
this teaching was, on an eleven-point scale ranging from 
1 (very superficial) to 11 (very detailed). The retired people 
2 Both studies were carried out with French-
speaking participants. These data therefore infer 
nothing about how Dutch-speaking participants 
would have answered the same questions. 
3 Participants self-completed their questionnaire, 
which is a potential source of bias (Richardson et 
al. 2006). However, the questionnaire was specially 
designed for self-completion, to avoid known biases. 
Questionnaires were carefully scrutinized and in-
complete or inconsistent responses were discarded.
4 Gender had no significant effect on any 
of the variables of interest, and is there-
fore excluded from the discussion.
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reported having received slightly more detailed informa-
tion about colonialism (M = 3.75) than students (M = 3.21), 
but the difference was not significant (t (55) = 1.17; n. s.). 
They were also asked to what extent this teaching conveyed 
a negative or positive image of colonialism. Retired people 
reported having been taught a significantly more positive 
image (M = 6.56) than the students (M = 5.07. t (56) = 2.82; 
p < .01). These results suggest that exposure to information 
about colonialism did not change dramatically between 
these two generations, and that the information was not 
quantitatively different, but they do show that the valence 
changed from positive to more negative representations of 
colonialism. 
Results from the Three-Generation Study allow the effects 
of the information to be evaluated more closely. One of the 
questions asked participants to rate how informed they 
felt about the colonization of the Congo, on a nine-point 
scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much). This time 
grandparents (M = 5.38) felt more informed than students 
(M = 3.60), with parents standing in-between (M = 4.85. 
F (2, 496) = 30.06; p < .001).5 This suggests that sources of 
information other than schooling might account for the 
difference. More revealingly, we examined the correlations 
between this variable (feeling informed) and emotions (col-
lective guilt and pride). It turns out that, among grandpar-
ents, feeling informed correlates positively with pride (r 
(152) = .46; p < .001) and negatively with collective guilt (r 
(152) = -.19; p < .05), whereas among the students it correlates 
positively with collective guilt (r (178) = .18; p < .05). Feeling 
informed also correlates positively with pride among the 
parents (r (167) = .22; p < .01). This result suggests that infor-
mation on colonialism is interpreted in radically different 
ways in different generations.
5. Different Representations of Colonialism
In the Two-Generations Study, participants were asked to 
rate their agreement with a series of traits applied to King 
Leopold II. A principal components factor analysis revealed 
a two-factor structure accounting for 57.3 percent of the 
variance. After a Varimax rotation, one factor included 
positive traits: humanism, generosity, patriotism, visionary 
king, philanthropy, love of the Congo, and altruism, while 
a second included negative traits: greed, megalomania, and 
cruelty. Comparing factor scores on these two dimensions 
shows how strikingly differently this emblematic figure 
of colonialism is perceived in the two generation groups: 
students view him as greedy, megalomaniac, and cruel (M 
= .28), and reject his positive traits (M = -.18), whereas the 
retired emphasize his positive traits (M = .21) and reject his 
negative ones (M = -.34). A Mixed Anova with the two fac-
tors as a within-subject factor and age group as a between-
subjects factor revealed a significant interaction (F (1, 116) = 
17.29; p < .001), but no main effects. 
In the Three-Generation Study, towards the end of the ques-
tionnaire, participants were invited to let us know what they 
had in mind when answering the previous questions. They 
were asked to rate the extent to which they had thought 
about a series of items describing different aspects of 
colonialism on nine-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all) 
to 9 (very much). This set of items gives us access to partici-
pants’ representations of colonialism. A principal compo-
nents analysis was again carried out. It led to a two-factor 
structure accounting for 62 percent of the variance. The first 
factor, labeled “exploitation,” included the following items: 
forced labor, exploitation of the Congolese, racial segrega-
tion, mutilations, massacres, and exploitation of natural 
resources for profit. The second factor, “development,” com-
prised building the educational system, hospitals, roads, 
and economic infrastructure, and the work of churches 
and missionaries. The factor scores were saved, and mean 
scores on each of them were compared between the three 
generation samples. A Mixed Anova with these two factors 
as a within-subject factor and generation group (students, 
parents, grandparents) as a between-subjects factor yielded 
a main effect of generation group (F (1, 478) = 7.86; p < .001) 
as well as a significant interaction (F (2, 478) = 45.72; p < 
.001). Students thought largely in terms of exploitation (M 
= .20), and rejected the development dimension of colonial-
5 Degrees of freedom vary as a func-
tion of the number of participants who 
failed to answer some of the questions.
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ism (M = -.52). In contrast, grandparents mainly mentioned 
the positive development aspects (M = .36), and rejected the 
exploitation aspects (M = -.28). Parents stood in-between 
the other two generation groups on the exploitation (M = 
.04) and development (M = .24) factors.
We examined correlations between the representation 
variables and collective guilt. Collective guilt correlates 
positively with the exploitation factor (among the three 
generation groups, r (178, 164, 144)=  .35 .42, and .46 for stu-
dents, parents, and grandparents, respectively; all ps < .001), 
but does not correlate negatively with the other two factors. 
This suggests that negative representations tend to trigger 
this negative emotion, whereas positive representations do 
not efficiently shelter individuals from it.
Through another set of items we measured how participants 
perceived the role of the Belgians during the decolonization 
process. Three items depicted the decolonization process 
as the abandonment of the Congolese by the Belgians: “The 
Belgians abandoned the Congolese during decolonization,” 
“During decolonization the Belgians behaved in a cowardly 
way,” and “The Belgians did not adequately prepare the 
Congolese for independence” (α = .64). Previous interviews 
with former colonials (Licata and Klein 2005) had revealed 
that this representation was prevalent among them. We 
found no significant mean differences between the three 
generation groups when comparing them on a variable 
averaging these three items. But when we entered both the 
exploitation and abandonment factors as predictors in a 
multiple linear regression (one for each generation group) 
we found that representing colonialism in terms of exploita-
tion remains a significant predictor of collective guilt in all 
three groups (β = .32 (students), .39 (parents) and .39 (grand-
parents); ps all < .001, all βs standardized). However, believ-
ing that the Belgians abandoned the Congolese significantly 
induces collective guilt among the grandparents (β = .27; p 
< .01), and marginally significantly among the parents (β = 
.14; p = .06), but not among the students.6
Two conceptions of morality seem to be involved in these 
generations. In the Three-Generation Study we asked 
participants how moral or immoral they judged colonial-
ism to have been through two items: “The colonial system 
implemented by the Belgian administration in the Congo 
was morally reprehensible” and “The colonial system imple-
mented by the Belgian administration in the Congo was 
broadly acceptable, from a moral point of view” (reversed. 
α = .82). As expected, students judged it very immoral (M 
= 6.30), grandparents judged it far less immoral (M = 4.61), 
and parents again expressed an intermediate position (M 
= 5.59) that differed from the other two groups (F (2, 496) 
= 27.39; p < .001). What is more, we found that collective 
guilt was triggered by different factors in the two groups: 
students felt guilty because their group had committed ille-
gitimate actions against an out-group (exploitation). Grand-
parents felt guilty when they believed colonialism had been 
illegitimate, but also because Belgium had abandoned the 
Congolese, i.e., for its withdrawal from the colony. Moral 
judgement can thus be envisioned as based on responsibility 
for past misdeeds (students) or on transgression of a pater-
nalistic duty (grandparents).
In order to check whether the difference in collective guilt 
between the three generations could be explained by the 
difference we found in representations about colonialism, 
we performed a mediation analysis. We first regressed col-
lective guilt on generation (1 = students; 2 = parents, and 
3 = grandparents) and found, as expected, that generation 
negatively predicted collective guilt: the older the genera-
tion, the less guilt is expressed, although the effect is quite 
small (β = -.13; p < .01). Next we verified that generation 
negatively predicted scores on the exploitation factor (β = 
-.19; p < .001), and that the exploitation factor positively pre-
dicted collective guilt (β = .43; p < .001). Then we regressed 
collective guilt on the two other variables (generation 
and exploitation). This way, exploitation still significantly 
predicted collective guilt (β = .42; p < .001), whereas the 
direct effect of generation on collective guilt was no longer 
6 Students:  F (2, 167) = 10.67; p < .001, ad-
justed R² = .10. Parents: F (2, 158) = 19.76; p < 
.001, adjusted R² = .19. Grandparents: F (2, 
140) = 29.79; p < .001, adjusted R² = .29.
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significant (β = -.04; p = .29). The result was confirmed by 
a test of mediation (Sobel’s z = 3.96; p < .001). This suggests 
that the difference in collective guilt we observed between 
the three generations can be explained, at least partially, 
through the difference in the representations of colonialism 
as a function of generation.
These results tend to confirm an explanation in terms of 
the different socialization patterns experienced by the three 
groups. However, this does not rule out a second explana-
tion in terms of the present identity functions of collective 
memories.
6. Different Identity Functions
The pioneering study on collective guilt by Doosje, Brans-
combe, Spears, and Manstead (1998) shows that those who 
identified strongly with their country (high identifiers) 
expressed less collective guilt than low identifiers when con-
fronted with an ambiguous description of the Netherlands’ 
colonial past. They argue that, in line with social identity 
theory (Tajfel et al. 1986), high identifiers protect their social 
identity from these negative aspects and therefore do not 
experience collective guilt, whereas low identifiers are less 
motivated to protect national identity and therefore felt this 
unpleasant emotion.
This could explain the intergenerational difference in 
collective guilt that we observed, provided that levels of na-
tional identification do indeed vary across generations. We 
compared levels of national identification in the Three-Gen-
eration Study. As expected, grandparents identify signifi-
cantly more strongly with Belgium (M = 6.68) than parents 
(M = 5.20) or grandchildren (M = 5.02. F (2, 497) = 40.55; p 
< .001). Levels of identification differed in the same way in 
the Two-Generation Study, with retired people expressing 
higher levels of identification (M = 7.4) than students (M = 
5.8. t (116) = 4.70; p < .001). However, Belgian identification 
did not show a linear relationship with collective guilt in 
any of the three groups.7
We then checked whether national identification was relat-
ed to representations of the colonial past. In the Two-Gen-
eration Study we compared correlations between national 
identification and the two factors of representations of King 
Leopold II. We found a positive correlation between na-
tional identification and the positive representation (r (54) 
= .31; p < .05), and a negative correlation between national 
identification and the negative representation of the king 
(r (54) = .30; p < .05) among the retired participants, but no 
significant correlation among the students.
In the Three-Generation Study we also found a positive 
correlation between national identification and the civiliza-
tion factor (r (155) = .19; p < .05) and a negative correlation 
with the exploitation factor (r (155) = -.17; p < .05) among the 
grandparents, but no significant correlation was obtained 
among the students and the parents. The negative represen-
tations of colonialism expressed by the students seem to be 
independent of national identification. As a conclusion, it 
appears that the social identity protection function of col-
lective memories can only be applied to the oldest genera-
tion. Students’ representations seem to be generally nega-
tive, independently of their level of national identification. 
7. Dealing with Collective Guilt: Avoidance or Reparation
As stated above, collective guilt is an aversive emotion. In 
order to avoid it, people may refer to what Roccas, Klar, and 
Liviatan label “exonerating cognitions” (2004), i.e., ideas 
that tend to lessen the moral implications of past group 
actions. In their studies of the Israeli-Palestinian relations, 
they found that blaming the victims or minimizing the 
events (the forced evacuation of Palestinians in 1948) proved 
efficient. 
In the Three-Generation Study we included a set of thirteen 
exonerating cognitions items suggested by previous inter-
views with former colonials (Licata and Klein 2005). A prin-
cipal component analysis revealed a three-factor structure 
accounting for 60.89 percent of the variance. The first factor 
7 Further investigation showed that the relation-
ship between Belgian identification and collective 
guilt was quadratic, with an inverted U-shaped 
curve, suggesting that only middle identifiers 
expressed collective guilt, and that the relationship 
did not significantly vary as a function of genera-
tion group (see Klein, Licata, and Pierucci 2010).
53IJCV : Vol. 4 (1) 2010, pp. 45 – 57Licata and Klein: Holocaust or Benevolent Paternalism?
includes items relating to the benevolence and morality of 
the Belgians’ behavior during colonization, such as: “Over-
all, the Belgians behaved very humanely in the Congo” and 
“During the colonial period, Belgians often behaved in an 
immoral way with the Congolese.” We refer to this factor as 
virtuous colonialism. The second factor is composed of four 
items evoking the difference between today’s values and 
those that were typical of the colonial times, for example: 
“One cannot judge colonial actions by today’s values” and 
“The colonials and the Belgian administration only fol-
lowed the spirit of their times.” This moral relativist stance 
could allow the illegitimacy of colonial actions to be relativ-
ized by modifying moral standards and suggesting that one 
cannot judge the colonials’ behavior by today’s standards. 
Finally, the third factor covered two items about the repre-
sentativeness of the colonials: “During the colonial period, 
the behavior of the colonials and the Belgian administration 
were broadly representative of the will of the Belgian people 
at that time” and “The colonials were not really representa-
tive of the Belgians in general” (negative loading). Unrepre-
sentativeness is a sub-typing strategy: by stressing that only 
a sub-category of the in-group was involved in colonialism, 
participants preserve a positive image of the group and thus 
avoid experiencing negative emotions.
Multiple regression analyses were carried out with these 
four exonerating cognitions variables as predictors and 
collective guilt as the dependent variable. The results show 
that different kinds of exonerating cognitions are at work 
in the three groups. Virtuous colonialism proved to be an 
efficient negative predictor of collective guilt among the 
grandparents (β = -.57; p < .001) and the parents (β = -.30; 
p < .001), but not among the students (β = -.09; p = .24). 
Moral relativism also negatively predicted collective guilt 
among the parents (β = -.30; p < .001) and the grandparents 
(although only with marginal significance, β = -.14; p = .06), 
but not among the students (β = -.11; p = .15). Finally, repre-
sentativeness significantly affected collective guilt among 
the students (β =.22; p < .01), but not among the parents (β 
= .03; p = .64) or the grandparents (β = -.07; p = .35). The 
more students viewed colonial actions as representative of 
the whole Belgian population, the more collective guilt they 
experienced.
To sum up: The three generation groups employ distinct 
strategies to avoid collective guilt. Grandparents and par-
ents tend to avoid collective guilt by legitimizing colonial 
actions, either by stressing their inherent morality or by 
delegitimizing negative judgments by stressing the differ-
ent moral standards applying to colonials at the time. By 
contrast, students feel less collective guilt when they believe 
that the colonials were not representative of the Belgian 
population, thus protecting their national identity. It is 
worth noting, though, that this model tends to predict only 
a small proportion of variance among the students.8
Another way to deal with collective guilt is to face the im-
morality of the in-group’s past actions, experience the nega-
tive emotion, and engage in behavior aimed at repairing 
the harm. Accordingly, collective guilt correlated positively 
with support for reparation – both symbolic and material – 
in the three groups (students: r (178) = .32; p < .001; parents: r 
(167) = .51; p < .001; grandparents: r (156) = .52; p < .001).
8. Political Positioning
Political positioning on a left to right continuum – on a 
nine-point scale ranging from 1 (very left-wing) to 9 (very 
right-wing) – also varied as a function of generation, with 
the students holding more left-wing positions (M = 3.93) 
than parents (M = 4.48) and grandparents (M = 4.79. F 
(2. 465) = 10.09, p < .001). Political positioning correlated 
positively with national identification in the three groups 
(r (169) = .28, p < .001; r (155) = .16, p <.05; r (141) = .19, p < 
.05 for students, parents, and grandparents respectively). 
In addition, it correlated negatively with collective guilt 
among the parents (r (155) = -.35, p < .001) and grandparents 
(r (141) = -.29, p < .001), but not the students (r (170) = -.11, p 
= .14), and it correlated negatively with support for repara-
8 Students:  F (3, 164) = 4.48; p < .01,  adjusted 
R² = .06. Parents: F (3, 157) = 11.53; p < .001, 
adjusted R² = .17. Grandparents: F (3, 140) 
= 22.61; p < .001, adjusted R² = .33.
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tion among all three groups, especially among the parents 
(r (170) = -.26, p = .001; r (155) = -.51, p < .001; r (141) = -.28, p 
< .001 for students, parents, and grandparents respectively). 
However, multiple regression analyses carried out in the 
three groups show that collective guilt still significantly pre-
dicts support for reparation after controlling for the effect 
of political orientation (βs = .30, .33, and .48 for students, 
parents, and grandparents respectively; all ps < .001), sug-
gesting that expressing collective guilt is not just another 
way to take a political position.
9. Discussion
The studies we report here tend to confirm the hypothesis 
that differences in levels of collective guilt and support 
for reparative actions towards the former colonized can 
be traced back to important differences in socializa-
tion between the generations. Grandparents grew up in a 
largely pro-colonial ideological environment. At school 
they learned that colonialism was a positive enterprise that 
benefited both the colonizers and the colonized. The more 
informed they feel about colonialism, the more they are 
proud of Belgium’s colonial action. This is not surprising as 
we also found that their representations of colonialism were 
predominantly positive: they emphasize the importance of 
the civilizing mission and of the material, infrastructure, 
health, and educational development of the colony, but 
downplay the negative aspects of colonialism (exploitation, 
racism, atrocities). They also hold a very positive view of 
King Leopold II. By contrast, the young generation grew 
up in a much more critical ideological environment. They 
only remember the worst aspects of colonialism, perceive 
the colonial king as a cruel megalomaniac, and report guilt 
to the extent that they feel informed about colonialism. The 
middle generation consistently occupies an intermediate 
position between these two generation groups, suggesting 
that the trend is progressive. These results are highly com-
patible with the idea that collective memory depends on the 
social frameworks in which the historical events or periods 
were memorized (Schuman et al. 1997). These memories 
form during adolescence and early adulthood, and remain 
relatively stable over time.
However, this observation does not refute our second 
hypothesis, which refers to the current identity functions 
of collective memories. We consistently found that our 
measure of national identification significantly affected 
representations of colonialism (and of King Leopold II) 
among the oldest generation. By contrast, students’ answers 
on these variables were largely unaffected by their level of 
national identification. To sum up, grandparents generally 
held more positive representations of colonialism but this 
was modulated by their level of national identification: the 
more they identified, the more they held positive represen-
tations of colonialism. By contrast, students held negative 
representations independently of their level of national 
identification. As a conclusion, our functional hypothesis, 
derived from social identity theory, that collective memo-
ries and collective emotions serve identity-protecting func-
tions, can only be verified for the older generation (and, to a 
lesser extent, for the parents). How could that be explained?
So far, our analyses have been predicated upon the assump-
tion that guilt is an individual emotion. It can be viewed as 
collective because it derives from shared representations and 
from a common group membership. But we can take this 
idea a step further and wonder whether guilt has become 
normative. Some have described a general tendency for 
Western societies to engage in repentance (Paez 2010; Bar-
kan 2000). This thesis was put forward recently by French 
philosopher Pascal Bruckner in his bestselling anti-collec-
tive-guilt pamphlet, The Tyranny of Guilt: An Essay on West-
ern Masochism (2010). He suggests that after the mass kill-
ings of colonialism and two world wars European nations 
have developed a “culture of guilt” that involves admitting 
all past misdeeds in order to maintain a positive self-image 
as more “moral” than other countries. One of the functions 
of this “culture of guilt” is to demonstrate inner morality 
and to differentiate oneself from “immoral” others. Bruck-
ner’s thesis is probably overblown, with its sweeping con-
demnation of European nations’ policies of public apology 
and reparation for their former victims, whereas evidence 
is available showing that they can have positive effects on 
members of both former victim groups (Blatz, Schumann, 
and Ross 2009) and former perpetrator groups (Lastrego 
and Licata 2010; see Paez 2010 for a review). But Bruckner 
usefully draws our attention to the normative nature of 
collective guilt and its identity function. Those who express 
guilt about their past misdeeds are viewed positively. Thus, 
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expressing guilt might be a way to affirm a social identity as 
“tolerant.” Similarly, findings of research using the minimal 
group paradigm suggest that one social differentiation strat-
egy ironically involves being “fairer than the others” (Jetten, 
Spears, and Manstead 1996). This could help us explain why 
students express high levels of collective guilt. In the present 
situation, collective memories of colonialism do not serve 
the function of protecting national identity by presenting 
a glorious past; these memories tend to be expressed as a 
means to display conformity to the current social norms, 
which indirectly casts a positive light on one’s own identity. 
Research on “social identity performance” (Klein, Spears, 
and Reicher 2007) suggests that people sometimes engage 
in purposeful acts of identity expression that cannot be 
explained only in terms of specific internal representations 
but are also strategic moves aimed at influencing audiences 
in particular ways, either to “verify” (consolidate) social 
identity or to mobilize audiences into engaging in specific 
behaviors (Klein and Licata 2003).
This normative dimension of collective memories can thus 
help us account for the way the colonial past is represented 
among generation groups. Integrating a past event into the 
identity narrative of a group plays a role in defining the val-
ues and norms that this group intends to adopt in the pres-
ent and in the future (Liu and Hilton 2005). In this case, the 
colonial past is perceived as incompatible with the group’s 
current identity. On the contrary, it now appears necessary 
to establish distance from these events, to construe a critical 
representation of them. Among Belgian students, the whole 
representation of the colonial past seems to be affected by 
the violation of human rights associated with the Leopol-
dian period (1885–1908). Conversely, grandparents project 
their benevolent representation of Belgian colonialism 
(1908–1960) onto the whole colonial history of the Congo, 
including the Leopoldian period. This explains why we 
observed that students feel guilty for the immoral actions 
committed during the colonial period, whereas grandpar-
ents also feel guilty for having abandoned the Congolese. 
For students, colonialism actually serves as an antithesis in 
the group’s identity narrative. In the same way as a histori-
cal example that is seen as edifying can be presented in an 
exclusively positive manner in order to symbolize the best 
of the group’s values, a historical antithesis can be presented 
in an even more negative way to better highlight the quali-
ties that group members wish to appropriate. 
The example of the severed bronze hand with which we 
began this article would seem to obey this logic. However, 
the Ostend anarchists demand not the destruction of the 
monument to the glory of Leopold II (which would fit the 
notion of oblivion), but that a critical comment be added to 
it to point out the incompatibility of Leopold’s colonial acts 
with today’s values. That would change the monument’s 
identity-related assertion from “We are a nation that colo-
nized another for its own good” to “We are a nation that 
unfairly colonized another, but we have learned the critical 
lessons of that experience.”9
9 Although we cannot, of course, condone 
the method used to convey the message. 
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